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A VARIABLE ANNUITY IS NOT A "SECURITY"
I. INTRODUCTION
The variable annuity is an annuity providing a life in-
come, not of a fixed number of dollars, but of variable
amounts keyed to an underlying common stock investment
portfolio. The development of this new concept in retire-
ment income planning may be traced directly to mankind's
continuing search for greater economic security. The
advocacy of variable annuities stems from the desire to
avoid the dilemma in which many persons now retired
on individual or group pension plans find themselves.
Annuity incomes which seemed adequate when purchased
years ago often fail to meet the buyer's needs of the
present day, primarily because of the impact of inflation
on the purchasing power of the dollar. For example, a
person receiving a $2,500 pension in 1940 would, by
1951, have to receive $4,500 to have the same purchasing
power. Consequently, existing types of fixed-dollar annui-
ties have not been satisfying the retirement needs of the
American public.
Where, then, can this security be found? It would appar-
ently call for a retirement income which afforded a fairly
constant amount of purchasing power. Maintaining such
constancy may require more dollars in one year and fewer
dollars in another. Variable annuities can help to provide
such an income and thus bring that desired security
closer to reality. Authoritative economic studies of the past
seven decades indicate clearly that over the long term,
the prices of a large group of common stocks went up and
down as the prices of commodities in general went up
and down, although they sometimes went in opposite
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directions for short periods. Furthermore, the valuation
of the common stocks generally fluctuated to a greater
extent.'
These studies likewise show that during this same
period, if individuals could have used about one-half of
their retirement savings to buy variable annuities based
on common stocks and had put the rest of those savings
into fixed-dollar annuities, the combined income from the
two types of annuities would have provided a fairly con-
stant amount of purchasing power, much more stable
than either type of annuity would have provided by it-
self. The fixed-dollar annuity would have helped to keep
the combined income from declining too drastically when
the value of the common stock investments dropped while
the variable annuity would have provided some protection
against loss of purchasing power when prices rose. It is
for this reason that many of the nation's leading life in-
surance companies have proposed that variable annuity
contracts should be made available to those who want
this balanced type of retirement income protection.2 Ob-
1 See GREENOUGH, A NEW APPROACH TO RETMIRENT INCOME (1951), an
economic report prepared for the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associ-
ation as background material for its College Retirement Equities Fund.
2 Leaders in the insurance industry have emphasized repeatedly that
insurance companies must provide new forms of coverage that will meet
the ever-increasing needs of a changing economy. Speaking in support of
variable annuities before the New Jersey Senate Business Affairs Com-
mittee, at a public hearing on June 22, 1956, Louis W. Dawson, President
of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, said:
"Now we live in what might be termed an 'age of improvement.'
Like every other business, the life insurance business has a public
duty to improve its products and services in every possible way,
and to conduct reasonable experiments with that end in view.
. . . Our business has always been willing to experiment and
innovate in any way that offered a reasonable chance to benefit
our policyholders and their families. And I think this very strongly,
gentlemen, that we must maintain that progressive and open-minded
attitude, if we are to serve future generations as we have served
past generations."
Similar recognition of the need for, and the challenge to the insurance
industry to provide new forms of coverage was well expressed by the re-
tiring president of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
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viously, it cannot be predicted with certainty that common
stocks, and therefore, this combination of annuities, will
continue to bear this same long-term relationship to prices
in general, but there is good reason to believe that the
relationship will be maintained.
There can be no disagreement as to the existence of the
problem indicated or of the immediate need for a workable
approach which will involve an adjustment in the method
of providing retirement income. The fixed-dollar annuity
alone cannot provide the needed protection and the public's
recognition of this fact is obvious from the drastic decline
in the sale of such contracts? Nevertheless, there is a defi-
nite continued need for fixed-dollar annuities because no
other type of contract can afford the recipient such solid
protection against loss of income. The variable annuity
contracts are not a panacea or a substitute for life in-
surance or fixed-dollar annuities, but rather they should
be considered as a supplement to these existing types of
pension contracts. In this sense, variable annuities are
Wade 0. Martin, Jr., who, speaking at the 1952 meeting of the Life
Insurance Association of America, said:
".. . The best insurance that you could possibly have against
further encroachment by the federal government is to provide new
forms of coverage that will meet the ever increasing needs of a
changing economy.
So, I urge you to make a determined effort at experimentation
in new fields of coverage, in new policy forms. And whenever you
find that you can enlarge your services, consistent with sound
underwriting practices, make every effort to do it."
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Marion B. Folsom, in a speech
before the Life Insurance Association of America at New York on Dec. 14,
1955, made the same point:
"Although our strides have been great in the private pension field,
there is a crying need today for a renewed display by the insurance
industry of its traditional enterprise and ingenuity. Even with our
advances, many millions of workers still lack sufficient protection.
We need more and improved private retirement plans, and we
need improvements in many plans already in effect."
3 In 1956, the Prudential Insurance Company of America sold 559
annuities as compared with a peak year high of 8,834 in 1934; the Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. sold 184 annuity contracts in 1954 as opposed to a 1935
high of 3,875. All indications point to a similar experience on the part of the
.other companies.
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just one more tool available in the continuing search for
economic security. To this date, the variable annuity con-
tract is the only concrete, practical means available to
obtain a life income which will correspond to changes in
the cost of living and will grow in accordance with ex-
pansion in the nation's economy.
Despite its merits, the plan has met with considerable
opposition. The mutual funds and others connected with
the securities business view variable annuities as a potent
source of competition, and have launched upon a "search for
security" in a special sense, alleging that variable annuities
constitute that type of "security" which under federal law
is subject, in its sale and distribution, to regulation and
control by the Securities and Exchange Commission. A
refutation of this contention shall constitute the framework
of this article.
II OPERATION OF A VARIABLE AN-NUITY
Presently, the general public cannot obtain annuity
contracts on a variable basis, which will provide an income
to continue for the lifetime of the annuitant, determined
scientifically in accordance with actuarial principles of life
contingencies, and which will liquidate a principal sum
exactly over the uncertain period of the annuitant's life-
time, except from a few relatively new companies formed
for the express purpose of marketing this type of contract.
Despite this unavailability, a great deal of public interest
has been generated in this type of contract.
Legislation on this subject, presently pending in New
Jersey and approved by the .New Jersey Department of
Banking and Insurance, has two major objectives. The first
is to authorize any New Jersey life insurance company
19571
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to establish a segregated account to be known as the vari-
able contract account, the assets of which may be invested
to a large extent in common stock and other equity se-
curities. This authority is necessary only for the establish-
ment of segregated investment accounts which will'serve as
a means of earmarking the variable annuity investments
and providing a yardstick for evaluating units of purchase
and payment. A company operating such an account would
issue variable annuity contracts pursuant to its existing
power to issue annuities. Under such variable annuity con-
tracts, payments would vary in dollar amount so as to re-
flect the investment results of the variable contract ac-
count.
The second major objective of the legislation, possessing
broader significance, is to provide the New Jersey Insurance
Department with far-reaching control over contract forms,
advertising, and sales methods applicable to variable con-
tracts issued in New Jersey by a company of any state. This
legislation would give the department authority to establish
regulations for the sale of such contracts, specifically in-
cluding, inter alia, requirements as to disclosure of the vari-
able nature of the obligations to prospective annuitants. Un-
der the proposed New Jersey legislation, mortality and ex-
pense assumptions would be guaranteed by the company
and would not affect the variations in values and payments.'
The variable annuity, as a life insurance company prod-
uct, is in the earliest stages of development. Undoubtedly,
the traditional ingenuity of American business will lead
to many different approaches, in manner of operation as
well as in contract terminology. For example, it is possible
that, as in the case of other life insurance company con-
tracts, some variable annuity contracts may provide for
participation in the form of insurance company dividends.
4 The term "expense" as defined in the pending legislation, N.J.
Assembly Bill 13 (1957), may exclude some or all taxes, as stipulated in the
contract. The rationale underlying this provision is the unpredictable nature
of future tax legislation.
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Furthermore, in some cases, the contract terminology, de-
signed with special attention to the need for conveying the
basic nature of the contract as understandably as possible,
may be in terms of concepts that need not necessarily be
used in the internal administration of the contracts. With
the foregoing in mind, it may be helpful, for illustrative
purposes, to consider one possible approach to a partici-
pating form of individual variable annuity contract, and
the way in which such contract might read.
A person buying such a variable annuity would not re-
ceive a contract guaranteeing to pay him a certain number
of dollars, as in the case of a standard or fixed-dollar an-
nuity but, instead, would be credited with amounts which
-would be keyed to the value of the assets in the special
account. When he became entitled to benefits, he would
receive, for life, annuity payments which would vary in
dollar amount. The value of the assets in the special ac-
count would be the yardstick for determining these dollar
amounts. Distributions would be based upon actuarial ap-
plication of mortality tables and would be within the scope
of accepted responsibilities and functions of life insurance
-companies.
The variable contract account would be a separate ac-
count of the issuing insurance company, with the invest-
-ments and liabilities clearly identifiable and distinguish-
able from the other investments and liabilities of the com-
pany. Except as might be otherwise specifically provided
by any variable annuity contract, all amounts received by
the company in connection with such a contract would be
placed in the variable contract account, and all liabilities
on such a contract would be set up in the account.
The individual variable annuity contract would specify
-a provision for insurance company operations, in actuarial
-terminology called the "loading," to be deducted from each
,consideration received and would further specify the
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mortality assumptions to be used in determining annuity
payments. It would also describe the essential features
of the procedure to be used in determining the dollar
amount of any variable benefits, such procedure to reflect
only the investment results of the variable contract ac-
count. This procedure would provide for an "actuarial
margin" to be deducted from investment results.
The insurance company would assume the risk that
actual expenses might exceed the provision made therefor,
or that mortality might be lower than provided for by the
specified mortality basis. In such respects, the company
position would be no different than under conventional
fixed-dollar annuity contracts. Any divisible surplus aris-
ing under variable annuity contracts by reason of the
margins provided, including the actuarial margin deducted
from investment results, would be determined and ap-
portioned by the insurance company, using suitable adap-
tations of conventional actuarial methods of life insurance
company dividend distribution.
A "consideration unit" could be considered as the basic
unit in which the contractual obligations of the insurance.
company would be expressed. In general terms, it partakes
of the nature of a special currency defined in the contract for
this express purpose. It would change in value to reflect
investment income as well as capital gains and losses, both
realized and unrealized, and would not be affected by
expenses' or mortality.
Since the value of a consideration unit would change,
in accordance with investment experience, it would be,
necessary to make periodic determinations of value. The
frequency with which such evaluations should be made,
might vary for different purposes. In the case of variable.
annuity contracts issued on an individual basis, it might
6 See note 4 supra.
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be appropriate to define the value as of the end of each
calendar month. For this purpose, a simplified example
will best illustrate the basic principles:
A. Assume that the variable contract account is estab-
lished at the end of January, 1958, at which time
payments totalling $1,000,000 are received under
variable annuity contracts. Assume further that the
value of a consideration unit as of January 31, 1958,
is set at $10.
B. Purely for the purpose of analyzing the arithmetical
computations involved, let us consider the over-
simplified example of a month, February, 1958,
where it is assumed that no funds are added to or
taken out of the variable contract account and that
at the end of February, 1958, the market value of
the assets of the variable contract account is $1,010,000.
C. The gross investment factor for the month of Febru-
ary, 1958, would be determined in accordance with a
procedure outlined in the contract, as follows:
$1,010,000
$1,000,000" = 1.0100
D. Assume that the contract specified an actuarial margin
of .001 to be deducted from the gross investment
factor, on a monthly basis.
E. The net investment factor for the month of February,
1958, would be 1.0100 - .001 = 1.0090.
F. The value of a consideration unit as of the end of
February, 1958, would be determined, as specified
in the contract, as the product of the value at the
end of January ($10) and the net investment factor
for February (1.009), or $10.09.
The above example is simplified, of course. The contract
would specify that the gross investment factor for any
month would be determined by the insuring company by
employing generally accepted accounting principles to
analyze the investment experience of the variable con-
tract account for the month, in terms of the number of
dollars which, at the end of the month, result from one
dollar remaining invested for the month in the variable
1957]
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contract account. It would summarize the result of the
monthly rate of capital gains and losses, both realized
and unrealized, as well as investment income.
The accounting methods used to determine the gross in-
vestment factor would be similar to those used by most
insurance companies to allocate investment results to a
particular branch of the business. The gross investment
factor for any month, being a purely investment factor,
would not depend upon expenses or mortality. Thus the
value of a consideration unit at any time would not be
affected by expenses or mortality. In this way, then, the
value of a consideration unit could be established as of the
end of each month.
The individual variable annuity contract would provide
that a fixed monthly consideration would be due on the
first of each month, and provide further that a specified
portion of each payment under the contract within the
period allowed would be applied to credit consideration
units to the contract at the end of the month in which
the payment was due. The portion to be applied would
represent the net consideration, after allowance for insur-
ance company operations. For example, if a contract calling
for considerations of one hundred dollars a month specified
that seventy per cent of the consideration paid in February,
1958, would be applied at the end of the month to credit
consideration units to the contract, then, based on the value
of one unit determined as above, the number of such units
credited would be 6.9376, determined by dividing $70 by
$10.09. In a similar fashion, there would be determined the
number of consideration units credited as a result of each
additional payment.
Prior to the commencement of annuity benefit payments,
actuarial dividends would arise from the excess, if any,
of the specified provision for insurance company operations
over the actual requirements, plus that portion of the speci-
[Vol. XXIH
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fled actuarial margin deducted from investment results
(taken arbitrarily above at the rate of .001 monthly for the
purpose of example) which is not required for other pur-
poses. Actuarial dividends declared might be applied to
credit additional consideration units, unless some other
treatment, permitted by the contract, was requested by the
annuitant.
The dollar amount of the initial annuity payment would
depend on the following factors: the current value of a
consideration unit; the age and sex of the annuitant; and the
type of annuity selected, e.g., life annuity, or life annuity
with a ten year minimum period. The contract would con-
tain tables of annuity factors based upon a mortality table
and an investment increment assumption, and would de-
scribe the procedure to be followed in making the calcula-
tion. The initial amount of annuity so determined could
then be expressed in terms of "payment units." The number
of payment units would depend on the then current value
of the "payment index."
The amount of the payment index would change only
in accordance with investment results. To illustrate, as-
sume that the payment index is set at $10 as of the initial
date of operation, February 1, 1958; that the annuity
factors assume an annual investment increment assump-
tion of two per cent; and that the payment index is to
be redetermined each month. Accordingly, the contract
would provide that to determine the payment index as of
March 1, 1958, a comparison would be made between the
net investment factor for the month of February, 1958,
and the assumed investment increment factor for one
month, roughly one plus one-twelfth of two per cent, or
1.0016. On the basis of the figures shown above, this com-
parison would be 1.0090/1.0016 =1.0074. In other words,
during the month of February, the net investment results
were seventy-four hundredths of one per cent better than
1957]
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assumed. Hence, the payment index as of March 1, 1958,
could be increased by seventy-four hundredths of one per
cent above the amount paid on February 1, 1958. The
calculation would be $10 times 1.0074 or $10.07. It should
be emphasized again that this procedure is entirely in-
dependent of both the mortality experience and the ex-
pense experience.
To illustrate the principles involved, let us consider a
male annuitant, holder of a variable life annuity- age
sixty-five at the time of conversion. For purposes of the
example, it will be assumed that a total of twelve hundred
consideration units have been credited to his contract
by that time; that the then value of a single unit is $12.00;
and that the current payment index at the time of con-
version, is $10.50. The net annuity factor for a life annuity,
male age sixty-five, assuming the 1937 Standard Annuity
Table and a two per cent annual investment increment,
is 6.92. That means that, on a fixed-dollar basis, $1,000
would provide a monthly annuity of $6.92. Assuming that
the annuity factors are on that basis, the procedure to de-
termine the number of payment units would be some-
what as follows:
(1) The value of the total consideration units is
equal to 1,200 units multiplied by $12, the
value of one unit, or $14,400.
(2) If applied on a fixed-dollar basis, the month-
ly payment would be 14.4 multiplied by
$6.92, or $99.65.
(3) The number of payment units providing
such a payment is determined by dividing
$99.65 by the amount of the payment index,
$10.50, and is found to be 9.49.
Thus, the conversion would provide 9.49 consideration
units. Each current monthly payment would be 9.49 times
[Vol. XXXII
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the applicable payment index.
Naturally, the actuarial basis for variable annuity con-
tracts, including the provision for company operations, the
mortality basis, and the margin deducted from the in-
vestment results, would be established on a scale pre-
sumed to be self-supporting. For example, if mortality
losses are incurred, then to the extent possible, any sur-
plus from either the expense provision or the investment
margin would, of course, be applied as required, just as
is the case in other areas of the life insurance business.
Furthermore, in a multiple line company, if the resources
of variable annuity contracts as a line of business became
inadequate, then as is generally true, the corporate surplus
would be available to overcome the deficit. Conversely, any
surplus of the variable annuity line is a part of the cor-
porate surplus for the purpose of meeting the needs of the
other lines.
In other words, variable annuity contracts would have a
relationship to the rest of the company's business very
similar to that of contracts in a foreign currency. The
company's obligations under the contracts in any such
currency are not limited to the company's resources
in that currency, but the payments made under such
contracts are nevertheless payable only in the cur-
rency specified in the contract. Thus, in the case of a com-
pany domiciled in the United States, a mortality catastro-
phe under Canadian dollar contracts might involve obli-
gations exceeding the Canadian dollar assets of the com-
pany. To honor its obligations, the company would draw
upon its United States dollar resources, but would never-
theless pay under Canadian dollar contracts only the num-
ber of Canadian dollars for which it is obligated by con-
tract. Fundamentally, this corresponds to the guarantees
which the company would make under its variable an-
nuity contracts.
1957]
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III. A VARIABLE ANNUITY Is AN ANNUITY
At common law, an annuity was generally defined as
"a yearly sum stipulated to be paid to another in fee, or for
life or years, and chargeable only on the person of the
grantor."6 However, because of continual expansion in
general and judicial usage to incorporate new develop-
ments in the field, the word has undergone many changes
in legal interpretation.' The word no longer refers merely
to a yearly or annual payment but is universally applied to
any periodical payment, whether it be quarterly, monthly
or at some other interval. As stated by Crobaugh, in An-
nuities and Their Uses: "In a strict sense the word an-
nuity infers that the interval of payment is one year, but
by gradual usage its meaning has been extended to include
other exact recurring intervals of time, such as six months,
three months or one month."' Furthermore, it is now gen-
erally conceded that an annuity may be made a charge on
real estate or on a specific fund, instead of being merely
chargeable "on the person of the grantor."9
The difficulty of assigning a precise definition to the term
stems primarily from the existence of so many varieties of
annuities.1 9 Life insurance companies are presently selling,
or have sold, many different types of annuity contracts.
There are life annuities, non-refund; life annuities, cash
refund; life annuities, installment refund; life annuities,
ten year guarantee (also known as life annuities, ten year
certain); joint and survivor annuities (also known as last
survivor annuities); survivorship annuities (also known as
reversionary annuities); immediate annuities; deferred
6 Taylor v. Martindale, 12 Simons 158, 59 Eng. Rep. 1092 (Ch. 1841).
7 See Day, A Variable Annuity Is an Annuity, INs. L. J. 775 (Dec. 1955),
for a comprehensive study and analysis of this expansion in the meaning of
the word "annuity."
8 CROBAUGH, ANNUrTIES AND THEIR USES 25 (1933).
* 3 C.J.S., Annuities § 1 (1936).
10 See WEBSTER, NaW INTERNATioNAL DIcTioNARY, 108 (2d ed. 1946).
(Vol. XXXII
1 ,A VARIABLE ANNUITY IS NOT A "SECURITY"
annuities; and retirement annuities. There are also partici-
pating annuities and non-participating annuities. The very
existence of this wide diversity demonstrates the extent to
which the word has been adapted to new applications.
Yet, despite these expansions, modifications and quali-
fications of the term "annuity," some opponents of the
variable annuity allege a lack of "certainty" ini this type of
contract. Adopting, without reservation, a will and trust
case type definition of the term, it is contended that the test
of an annuity is whether it provides for a certain, fixed-dol-
lar amount to be paid the annuitant periodically commenc-
ing on the annuity date. Even if this contention were correct
- and it is not - variable annuities would meet the test:
variable annuity benefits are "fixed amounts" since they
are definitely determinable on the basis of a rule and
formula set out in the applicable contract. In this context
the legal maxim, "that is certain which is, by necessary
reference, made certain,"'" is fully applicable.
A California case' applied this principle in determining
that an annuity, which had a variable feature, nevertheless
provided a "certain specified sum." The testatrix had
bequeathed an "annuity" to her sister-in-law in such an
amount as would, when added to any "annuities" be-
queathed to her by other members of the family, comprise
a total "annuity" of $8,400 a year. Other beneficiaries
claimed, by circuitous reasoning, that the testatrix was not
using the word "annuities" in a technical sense and that
all added income provided by changes in the wills in ques-
tion reduced the gift to the sister-in-law, thus providing
more for the other beneficiaries. It was contended that
the sister-in-law's annuity was not a bequest of a "certain
specified sum" because the amount she was to receive from
the testatrix's will was not fixed, but was to be ascertained
3" See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820).
12 In re Bourn's Estate, 25 Cal. App. 2d 590, 78 P.2d 193, 198 (1938).
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by subtracting from $8,400 the amounts of annuities from
other sources. The court rejected this argument, making
reference to the maxim of jurisprudence, "that is certain
which can be made certain," as incorporated in the Cali-
fornia Civil Code, 3 and held, that the sum in question was
"certain" since it could be easily calculated.
This is not merely an isolated application of an out-
moded principle. The Supreme Court of the United States
applied the maxim in upholding the validity of a railroad
charter provision attacked as indefinite and uncertain, pro-
hibiting the imposition of any tax on the railroad which
would reduce its dividends below eight per cent.' Similar-
ly, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a gasoline
station lease, which called for a monthly rental based on
a formula keyed to the number of gallons of gasoline sold,
did not violate a statute requiring that rentals in leases be
"certain and determinate," because the amount could be
readily ascertained. 5 Commenting on the inclusion of the
maxim in a statute providing for accrual of interest from
the day on which the right to recover damages "certain
or capable of being made certain by calculation" vests in an
aggrieved person, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has said: "The effect of this provision is to say that
that is certain and definite which by accepted standards of
calculation can be made certain."' 6
There are many cases which involve the interpretation
of wills and trusts, as well as various tax questions, which
include definitions of the word "annuity." The stereotyped
definitions are used primarily as a guide for determining
what the testator or settlor actually intended, generally
'a CAL. CIV. CODE AxN § 3538 (West 1954).
14 Mobile & O.R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 497 (1894).
15 Lee v. Pearson, 143 So. 516 (La. App. 1932). See also Brown v.
Shreveport, 15 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 1943).
3-6 Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Ranney-Davis Mercantile Co., 173 F.2d
844, 851 (10th Cir. 1949).
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the only issue in such cases, and it frequently will be
found that the definitions have little bearing on the decision
in the case. In these cases variable types of annuities
seldom have been involved, so that no issue such as the
one presently under consideration was before the court. In
the few cases which have involved something approaching
a variable annuity, the courts have not been deterred by
the variable feature from designating the plan as an an-
nuity." The most important consideration is the fact that
the courts in these cases were not dealing with questions
of corporate power of life insurance companies or their
logical functions and responsibilities. As has been pre-
viously indicated, there has developed such a wide variety
of annuity contracts issued by life insurance companies
that it would be absurd to contend that the definitions of
the term as applied in certain of the will and trust cases are
binding on the insurance companies.
The demand for "fixed-dollar certainty" has not been
echoed in current decisions and rulings which unanimously
have held that an annuity plan providing for varying dollar
payments is properly characterized as an annuity. The
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America
(TIAA) obtained a ruling from the federal tax authorities
with regard to its companion organization, College Re-
tirement Equities Fund (CREF), a variable annuity plan
which will be discussed more fully in a following section,
to the effect that benefits payable under variable plans of
the type here proposed, even without a mortality guaran-
tee, are "amounts received under an annuity contract."'"
35 See Fidelity Inv. Ass'n v. Emmerson, 318 111. 548, 149 N.E. 530 (1925).
For annuity plans providing benefits which might in fact be variable in
amount, see Arkansas Nat. Bank v. Mayer, 216 Ark. 255, 225 S.W.2d 331
(1950); Einbecker v. Einbecker, 162 Ili. 267, 44 N.E. 426 (1896); Schloesser
v. Schloesser, 329 Ill. App. 604, 70 N.E.2d 346 (1946); In re Flickwir's Estate,
136 Pa. 374, 20 Ati. 518 (1890). See also cases cited in Annot., 1917E
L.R.A. 580, 584.
18 Private letter ruling dated September 9, 1951.
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An Internal Revenue Service formal general ruling dated
September 14, 1953, specifically states that a plan provid-
ing benefits varying with changes in the market value of
the assets from which such benefits are payable will be
recognized as a plan providing for "definitely determinable
benefits" and such benefits will be recognized as "annuity"
payments as those words are used in the Internal Revenue
Code. 9 This ruling upheld the variable annuity plan of the
Long Island Lighting Company as a qualified pension trust.
The statutory definition of an annuity, as it appears in
the New York Insurance Law stipulating the kinds of
insurance which may be issued in that state, is as follows:
2. "Annuities," meaning all agreements to make peri-
odical payments where the making or continuance of all
or of some of a series of such payments, or the amount
of any such payment, is dependent upon the continuance
of human life, except payments made under the authority
of paragraph one.9°
An interpretation of this section, and particularly of the
words "periodical payments," was necessary in the case of
In re Supreme or Cosmopolitan Council.2' The society
operated what was referred to as a "Life-Annuity System,"
requiring each member to make an annual dues payment
of at least $10, with excess amounts contributed as desired.
Such excess contributions were deposited in a benefit fund
invested in income-producing properties and the earnings
from the fund were held in a separate account available
for dividends, at the discretion of the executive committee,
after payment of expenses. Death, resignation or three
'9 Rev. Rul. 185, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 202. See also Johnson, The Variable
Annuity, 7 C.L.U. JOURNAL No. 1, 67, 73 (Dec. 1952); Johnson, An
Experiment with the Variable Annuity, PaocErmwas, AssocIATsoN oF LnM
INsuRANcE COuNSEL 1952-53, 627-28; and Day, supra note 7, at 776.
20 N.Y. INs. LAw § 46.
21 In re Supreme or Cosmopolitan Council, 193 Misc. 996, 86 N.Y.S2d
127 (Sup. Ct. 1949); see also, formal New York Attorney General's opinion
cited in the above case, 1947 REP. ATT'y Gm. 214.
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years' dues delinquency resulted in an individual's account
being prorated among the other members of his "birth
year class," with consequent increase in their future annual
income distributions. The society was not licensed to do an
insurance business and the Superintendent of Insurance
sought to liquidate it under provisions of the New York
Insurance Law,22 maintaining that it was not necessary for
a plan to promise fixed amount payments in order to con-
stitute the selling of annuities within the meaning of sec-
tion 46 of the Insurance Law. Sustaining the position of
the insurance department, the court stated:
... The Court agrees with the Attorney General's state-
ment that "The words 'periodical payments' [in the
statutory definition of annuities] do not necessarily entail
only fixed sums payable on specified dates. The annual
division and distribution of the Dividend Fund above
described would seem to be properly so designated."2 3
The New York Insurance Department took a similar
stand in response to an inquiry by the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America regarding the College
Equities Retirement Fund, advising that the fact of vari-
ation in amounts of periodic payments does not prevent the
payments from constituting an annuity.2  CREF, therefore,
as its act of incorporation provides, is subject to the super-
vision of the New York Insurance Department. The de-
partment has approved CREF contract forms and cer-
tificates which repeatedly refer to the variable benefits
plan in terms of "unit-annuity."
22 N.Y. Irs. LAW § 40 (1).
23 1n re Supreme or Cosmopolitan Council, 193 Misc. 996, 86 N.Y.S.d2
127, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
24 An informal ruling received by the Association from the N.Y. Ins.
Dep't. See address by G. Johnson, An Experiment with the Variable
Annuity, PROCEEDINGS, AssocIATIoN or LE IESUa alcmC CouNsL 1952-53, at
637. Indicative of the widespread acceptance of the term "variable annuity"
is the fact that CREF, throughout its latest annual report, uses such term
in preference to its earlier standard, "unity-annuity."
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A recent Canadian case,' decided by the High Court
of Justice of Ontario, required construction of a will in-
volving an annuity with variable dollar benefits. While
decisions in will cases are not decisive in determining the
corporate powers of life insurance companies, the case is
of interest in showing the repeated use by the court of the
term "variable annuity" and the appositeness of this
phrase in describing this type of plan. Pertinent portions
of the opinion contained the following language:
This problem arises as a result of the second codicil
to the testator's will, which has a very elaborate provi-
sion subtituting a variable annuity to Alfred Warwick
Rogers in place of the definite one of $10,000 provided
for in para. 14 of the testator's will .... [I]t sets up
certain machinery which depends on the Dominion
Government's Cost of Living Index. Unfortunately, in
precise terms this index no longer exists. It was replaced
in 1952 by a somewhat similar index called "Consumer
Price Index"....
Reading further, it is quite clear that the testator
was substituting, for the fixed annuity, a variable annuity
which is weighted to Alfred Warwick Rogers' advantage
in case the cost of living rises, and which is liable to be
reduced if the amount calculated according to the test-
ator's direction is out of line with the income being re-
ceived by the testator's other two sons from any com-
panies controlled by the trustees of the estate. It was
urged by counsel for Alfred Warwick Rogers that those
provisions as to the reduction of the annuity were void
and unenforceable as being repugnant to a definite
vested gift of income in the beneficiary ...
It is to be observed that this provision for Alfred
Warwick Rogers, as altered by the codicil, does not
vest any definite sum of income in him but lays down,
as it were, a procedure by which the trustees are able
to calculate the amount they should pay him in any
given year and all that vested in the beneficiary, in my
view, was the right to receive such annuity to be calcu-
lated by the trustees in accordance with the rather com-
25 Re Rogers, 4 D.L.R. 422 (1955).
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plex procedure laid down by the testator in the codicil. ...
What the testator has done is to give an annui-
ty to Alfred Warwick Rogers which, in certain cir-
cumstances, is to be calculated according to certain de-
finite directions which he has given. If a further situation
arises where one of the other sons is enjoying a smaller
income from the testator's companies than the Alfred
Warwick Rogers annuity, the trustees are then given the
discretion to reduce the annuity of Alfred Warwick
Rogers, presumably to a degree that is comparable with
the income which the other sons are receiving from the
companies in question. In my opinion the testator was
entitled to make this direction.2 6
Variable annuity legislation presently pending in New
Jersey, which would recognize that such contracts may be
issued by life insurance companies under their existing
power "to grant, sell or dispose of annuities," has received
the approval of that state's Department of Banking and
Insurance.
Further recognition of the fact that the issuance of
variable annuity contracts comes within the existing legis-
lative authority of life insurance companies to write an-
nuities is evidenced by the District of Columbia Insurance
Department's licensing of Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company, July, 1955, and The Equity Annuity Life In-
surance Company, July, 1956, to engage in such business
under its supervision and regulation. The Arkansas In-
surance Department has also licensed the Participating
Annuity Life Insurance Company, Aug., 1954, and the
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company has been li-
censed to do business in West Virginia (Sept., 1956), Ken-
tucky (Feb., 1957), and Arkansas (May, 1957).
It is well established that in the interpretation of statutes
the words used should be given a meaning which will
further the purpose of the legislature. It is fair to say that
legislatures, in authorizing the writing of annuities, have
26 Id. at 428-29, 431-33.
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intended to facilitate the promotion of security for retired
persons. Having in mind the effects of past inflation and
the strong possibility that there may be a recurrence it is
reasonable to conclude that for true security in retirement
it is appropriate to make available something more than
income in dollars and to attempt to provide a reasonable
retirement income in terms of current purchasing power.
Furthermore, it is desirable that a retirement income con-
tract be available which offers to retired individuals an
opportunity to participate in the economic growth of the
country. Under such circumstances, any restricted defini-
tion which would limit or circumscribe accomplishment of
the statutory purpose should be rejected.
IV. A SUCCESSFUL VARIABLE ANNUITY PLAN
The variable annuity principles now in operation apply
to about 100,000 individuals in the United States. Further-
more, two life insurance companies outside the United
States, one in Great Britain27 and one in the Netherlands, s
offer variable annuity contracts.
The first variable annuity plan in this country, the
College Retirement Equities Fund, was created in 1952 by
the New York Legislature, acting upon the recommenda-
tion of a commission composed of educators and leading
businessmen, for the purpose of providing educators,
policyholders in the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America, with an annuity which would re-
spond more flexibly to changes in the economy and thus
furnish constant purchasing power.
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association is a non-
profit legal reserve life insurance company, founded in
27 London & Manchester Assur. Co., Ltd., of London, England.
28 DeWaerdye, Rotterdam, Netherlands.
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1918, and incorporated under the laws of the State of New
York. Its policyholders represent some 650 educational
institutions, and the company provides for these policy-
holders the ordinary type of guaranteed fixed-dollar retire-
ment income. The idea of CREF was developed by the
trustees and officers of the company after painstaking
study, in response to a widespread demand for an attempt
at protection from the depletion of a fixed-dollar retirement
income by an inflationary economy. Participation in the
plan is purely voluntary for the individual but, since 1952,
more than 25,000 college teachers and staff employees have
joined the program. Funds are invested exclusively in
-common stocks and its assets presently total well over
thirty million dollars.
Under the two part program, which affords the an-
nuitant a balanced income, part from CREF, determined
by the value of the fund's common stock holdings, and
part from fixed-dollar income provided by TIAA, the
educator may, for instance, pay five to ten per cent of his
annual salary in premiums, to which the participating
institution normally adds a like amount. He is permitted
to designate either a quarter, a third or a half of his
-annual premium for CREF participation. The portion
allotted results in credit of accumulation units to the
-contract at their current value under a continuing pro-
-gram of monthly revaluation. Thus, where the unit value
rises, fewer units are credited, and when it drops, more
-units are credited for the same consideration.
The participant continues to acquire accumulation
uinits until he reaches his retirement date. Dividends re-
,ceived from stocks held in the fund are credited to the
,contract holders in the form of additional accumulation
units. When a member retires, his accumulation units are
changed into retirement units, the exchange rate being
,determined by customary actuarial computations. The
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retirement income values of the annuity units vary from
year to year, depending on expenses, dividend experience,
mortality experience, capital gains and market value of
common stock investments. Under this procedure, since its
creation, CREF has paid out monthly for each annuity unit
$10 for the fiscal year 1952-53, $9.46 for 1953-54, $10.74 for
1954-55, and $14.11 for 1955-56.
As has been noted earlier, the New York Insurance-
Department which supervises CREF's operation has ap-
proved its certificate forms containing the phrase "unit
annuity" in referring to the variable benefits plan, and
has advised that the variation in amounts of payment does
not prevent these payments from constituting an annuity.
In the preparation of the brief filed by the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which resulted in the
ruling that a variable annuity constituted an annuity with-
in the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code,29 opinions
were solicited from a number of experts in the field. Six
outstanding actuaries and economists expressed their
opinion that a variable annuity is properly classified and
defined as an annuity.
For example, the following opinion was given by Joseph
B. Maclean, author of the standard treatise on life in-
surance:
In my opinion such an agreement is properly classified
and defined as an annuity contract. The essential char-
acteristic of a "life annuity" in my opinion is a provision
for payments at stated intervals during the lifetime of
the annuitant.
While annuity contracts, in general, specify the
amounts of the payments to be made, a provision that
the amount of each payment is to be determined at the
date of payment on the basis of a specified rule or for-
mula (so that the amount of each payment is, in fact, de-
29 See note 18 riupra.
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termined by the terms of the agreement) does not, in my
judgment, alter the fundamental character of the agree-
ment as an annuity contract.
It will be noted that Mr. Maclean emphasized the fact
that under a variable annuity proposal of the type here
involved, the amount of each payment was to be de-
termined at the date of payment on the basis of a specified
rule or formula set out by the controlling agreement. Once
again, that is certain which can be made certain.
V. WRITINO OF VARIABLE ANNUITIES CONSTITUTES
DOING INSURANCE BusINEss
The proposed variable annuities will involve actuarial
and mortality computations which are an appropriate part
of the general powers of life insurance companies. As pre-
viously stated, the intention of the variable annuity pro-
gram is to make available contracts which provide an in-
come to continue for the lifetime of the annuitant deter-
mined scientifically in accordance with actuarial principles
of life contingencies, liquidating a principal sum exactly
over the uncertain period of the annuitant's lifetime. The
actuarial considerations which must comprise the determi-
nation of this type of distribution with use of mortality
tables are within the traditional functions and technical
competence of life insurance companies. Aside from the
emphasis on common stocks in the investment fund, the
predominate feature in a variable annuity is an actuarial,
risk-pooling feature. The granting of annuities on a com-
mercial basis is essentially a life insurance company
function.
Generally under a variable annuity contract, the com-
pany as a whole guarantees the mortality and expense
aspects of the contracts, and the only contractual vari-
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ations in dollar values of units and benefits is reflected from
the investment results of the segregated account. The issu-
ing company assumes the risk that the mortality of the
group holding variable contracts may be less favorable
than anticipated at the time the annuity is issued and
further assumes the risk that the expenses of the operation
may be greater than allowed for in the loading provided
by the contract. Thus the outlined variable annuity plan
amounts to something quite different than the mutual
sharing by the participants of a mortality and expense
risk. Since variable annuities are based upon mortality
tables, and upon mortality guarantees, they come within
the logical functions of life insurance companies."
In most states issuance of annuities is recognized in the
applicable statutes as one of the powers of companies sell-
ing life insurance.3' Illustrative of this is the Maine statute,
which reads as follows:
All corporations, whether incorporated in this state
or elsewhere, which issue contracts whereby such cor-
porations, in consideration of a premium to be paid
annually or otherwise, agree to pay an annuity commenc-
ing in the future, or a sum fixed or to be ascertained by
given methods, are made subject, in relation to doing
business in this state, to all the provisions of law relating
to life insurance, including all provisions relating to
taxation.32
30 This conclusion is emphasized by leading textbook authorities. See
CYzIO, YOUR INSURANCE - ITS PROBLEMS AND THEIm SoLuTIoN 128 (1938),
where the author states: "Since both life insurance and annuities are based
on the mortality tables, logically they come within the province of in-
surance companies." See also MAGEE, GENERAL INSURNCE 738 (4th ed. 1953):
"The annuity is not strictly a life insurance contract. It is, nonetheless,
insurance. Fundamentally it distributes funds, together with earnings
thereon, in such a manner that payments will continue during the
lifetime of the annuitant."
31 See, e.g., the following statutes which construe the issuance of an-
nuities in broad terms as the doing of a life insurance business. ME. REV.
STAT. § 170 (1954); MIcH. COmP. LAWS § 522.29 (1948); MnmN. STAT. § 61.01
(1946); Miss. CODE § 5680 (1942); N.J. STAT. A i. 17:17-1 (Supp. 1956); N.Y.
INs. LAW § 46; OKLA. STAT. tit. 36 § 181 (1953); ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 101.117, 101.501 (1940); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANi. § 52-501 (1945).
32 ME. REV. STAT. § 170 (1954).
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Normally the power to issue annuities is not set out in a
separate subsection of the statutes authorizing the writing
of various "kinds of insurance," but is included in the same
subsection which relates to the power to sell life insurance.
Section 70 of the New York Insurance Law is illustrative of
such a plan. In a letter to the Superintendent of Insurance,
the Attorney General of New York clearly pointed out the
New York provision when he stated:
Section 70 of the Insurance Law provides in part:
"§ 70. Incorporation. Thirteen or more persons
may become a corporation for the purpose of
making any of the following kinds of insurance:
1. Upon the lives or the health of persons
and every insurance appertaining thereto, and to
grant, purchase or dispose of annuities."
This section provides who may form a corporation
for insurance purposes and proceeds to specifically en-
umerate in the subdivisions thereof the kinds of in-
surance which the corporation may make. The language
in the first paragraph of the section "the following kinds
of insurance" followed in subdivision 1 by the words
"annuities" plainly indicates that the Legislature in-
tended by the use of the word to designate an in-
surance.-3
Later in this same opinion the importance of the mor-
tality provision in determining whether a contract is an
annuity is emphasized:
The fixing of the mortality table as the minimum
standard for the valuation of annuities by the provi-
sions of subdivision 5 of Section 84 of the Insurance Law
presupposes the presence of the feature of mortality
risk. So also does the provision for adjustment in the case
of misstatement of the age of the person or persons upon
whose life or lives the contract of annuity it based, as
found in subdivision 4th of section 102 of the Insurance
Law. The mandatory character of this provision leads
one to the conclusion that the Legislature contemplated
33 INsuRANCE D'AmE= RULIMG, N.Y. 4 (1931).
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no annuity except one where the risk was dependent
upon age.3 4
It is also important to note that under the statutes of
many states prescribing penalties for doing an insurance
business without a license the statute includes reference
to writing annuities.3 5 This is another recognition that
annuities involving life contingencies are a logical function
of life insurance companies and, aside from those issued
by charitable institutions, they normally cannot be issued
at all except by an insurance company. It is appropriate to
point out that reference is made only to the sale of annuities
to the public by a business organization established for that
purpose and not the myriad contracts and arrangements
that might be used by individuals dealing with their own
affairs.
Despite what appears to be an overwhelming weight of
authority to the contrary, occasionally it is contended that
the variable annuity is not properly a life insurance com-
pany product; that the purchase of such a contract is
simply an investment in common stocks, and therefore,
that the variable annuity contract is a "security," the sale
of which must be registered with and regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The variable annuity is not a security or an investment
in common stocks. Spreading distribution of a capital
amount and the earnings therefrom over a lifetime in
accordance with scientific tables of mortality is a tradi-
tional function of life insurance companies. They are the
only type of business organization which can use this
annuity principle. Annuities are neither securities nor an
interest in securities, regardless of whether the assets
behind them are invested primarily in bonds and mort-
34 Id. at N.Y. 5
35 See e.g., N.J. STAT. AmN § 17:17-12 (1939) which prohibits the un-
authorized transaction of an insurance business in the state, specifically,
"including annuities involving life contingencies ... "
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gages and in lesser amounts in stocks, as at present, or pri-
marily in stocks, as proposed for future variable annuity
contracts. As an example of the numerous legal and
practical differences between an "annuity" and a "se-
curity," it should be pointed out that once the security is
transferred, the transferor is out of the picture. However,
if an annuity is assigned the transferee receives an annuity
contingent upon the continued survival of the original an-
nuitant. In the case of deferred annuities, as under the
typical group annuity contract, receipt of any benefit pay-
ments is contingent upon the survival of the participating
annuitant until the retirement date.
Nor are variable annuities similar to mutual fund shares.
Mutual funds cannot legally use the annuity principal
because they are not authorized to relate distributions to
mortality tables. They do provide a diversified investment
that permits getting in and out of the stock market at will.
Variable annuities, on the other hand, are designed for
long-term retirement planning purposes and, under the
plan proposed by the Prudential company, an annuitant
could not withdraw faster than over a period of three
years before retirement.
VI. INSURANCE EXEMPTIONS UNDER FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
The controversy about variable annuities and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission involves two funda-
mental questions which will be discussed in this and in
the following section. These are: (1) are variable an,
nuities presently subject to the federal securities acts
administered by the SEC and (2) if presently exempt,
should variable annuities be made subject to such acts?
There are four federal acts, portions of which have some
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application to this discussion: the Securities Act of 1933"6
(hereinafter referred to as the 1933 act); the Investment
Company Act of 1940"7 (hereinafter referred to as the 1940
act); the Securities Exchange Act of 193438 (hereinafter
referred to as the 1934 act); and the McCarran-Ferguson
Insurance Regulation Act39 (hereinafter referred to as the
McCarran Act).
Basically, the 1933 act requires the filing of a registra-
tion statement and the issuance and delivery of a pros-
pectus in connection with public sales of securities. Section
2(1) of this act, in material part, defines "security" as
follows: "The term "security" means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, ... investment contract, ...or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity" .... ." Section 3 (a) of the 1933 act contains a clear
and unmistakable exemption of insurance contracts, as
follows: ". . . The provisions of this title shall not apply
to any of the following classes of securities: (8) Any
insurance . . .or annuity contract, or optional annuity
contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision
of the insurance commissioner ... or any . . .officer per-
forming like functions, of any state ...."
Initially, it is apparent from this act that annuities, when
issued by an insurance company subject to the regulation
of a state insurance department, have been specifically
labeled by Congress as outside those classes of contracts
which the 1933 act was intended to affect.
Emphasizing this intention, the House Report, comment-
ing on this section, states:
36 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952).
37 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1--80a-52 (1952).
38 48 STAT. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1952).
39 59 STAT. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1952).
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Paragraph (8) makes clear what is already implied
in the act, namely, that insurance policies are not to be
regarded as securities subject to the provisions of the
act. The insurance policy and like contracts are not re-
garded in the commercial world as securities offered to
the public for investment purposes. The entire tenor of
the act would lead, even without this specific exemption,
to the exclusion of insurance policies from the provisions
of the act, but the specific exemption is included to make
misinterpretation impossible 4 0
The underlying and avowed purpose of the 1933 act, as
well as the other federal and state security acts, is the
protection of the public through the requirement of full
disclosure of all material facts bearing upon a purchase or
investment. Where there was already an adequately super-
vised procedure of disclosure, further control was con-
sidered to be unnecessary and an exemption was given.
Insurance and insurance companies, under the codes of
the several states and the supervision of state insurance
departments, are subject to the most exacting qualifications
and disclosure requirements.
A careful scrutiny of available case law fails to disclose
a single instance in which a life insurance annuity contract
has been held by any court to be a security within the
meaning of a securities law. On the contrary, in those cases
where application of the various state "Blue Sky" laws
was sought to be imposed upon insurance companies, the
courts have consistently upheld the exemption of such
contracts. In a very recent case the court stated that it did
"not recall a single instance in which we have heard an
annuity called a security either by the learned or the
vulgar."4' The court in this case stressed the importance
of the "risk-sharing" element in an annuity, stating:
40 H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933).
41 Haberman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 224 F.2d 401, 406 (4th
Cir. 1955).
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While annuities are sometimes called investments,
that is not an apt characterization. Indeed, it is not
unusual to hear a person say he is investing in a new
suit or a new car, but the essence of such transactions
is really quite different. An annuity is also quite differ-
ent; what makes it essentially an annuity is that it is
a form of risk-sharing. In life insurance, the risk from
which protection is usually sought is that the in-
sured may die young without provision for his depend-
ents; in an annuity, the risk is that the annuitant may
live long, outliving his means for his own support. To
the extent that insurance or annuities are risk-sharing,
they are certainly not investments. It is true that invest-
ment or other objectives can be combined in such plans,
but they are not of their essence.4
Similarly, in Bates v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
it was held that contracts providing for periodic lifetime
payments are not "securities" where the ". . . basis upon
which the promised payments were to be met is founded
upon actuarial computation based upon the experience
furnished by authentic mortality tables.... .""
Where a policy holder sought to cancel two annuity con-
tracts on the ground that the defendant had not complied
with the Blue Sky law, the court in Hamilton v. Penn
Mutual Life Ins. Co.,45 held that the contracts were not
subject to such requirements, saying:
These annuity policies, though not life insurance poli-
cies, are such as a life insurance company is authorized
to issue and therefore are subject to the provisions
of our statute regulating the business of life insurance
companies,... and not to the requirements, in this con-
nection, of the Blue Sky Law.46
Furthermore, the exemption of annuity contracts of the
42 Ibid.
43 206 Minn. 482, 288 N.W. 834 (1939).
- 288 N.W. at 835. 1
45 196 Miss. 345, 17 So.2d 278 (1944).
46 17 So. 2d at 280. Accord, Rinn v. New York Life Ins. Co., 89 F.2d 924
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 753 (1937).
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fixed-dollar variety from the provision of the 1933 act has
not been questioned. Conceivably, a variable annuity
contract hypothecated upon an investment predominantly
in bonds and other debt securities would likewise not be
so questioned. Yet, throughout the controversy about the
applicability of the 1933 act to variable annuities, there
is apparently an assumption that relating such a contract
to equity investments in some manner voids the exemp-
tion given to fixed-dollar annuities. This assumption is
without justification.
The definition of "security" in section 2(1) clearly
specifies that bonds are as fully securities as are common
stocks. Nothing in the 1933 act can be said to emphasize or
prefer one class of securities over the other. Neither is
there any implication whatever in the law that section
3 (a) (8) exempts annuity contracts only if they are keyed
to debt security investments or that the exemption does
not apply if such contracts are keyed to equity invest-
ments. In view of the pattern of state laws against which
this federal legislation must be interpretated, an insurance
company's authorized investment of its assets in one or the
other class of securities should not distinguish the contracts
which these investments sustain.
For many years prior to the enactment of the federal
securities laws, the granting of annuities of any kind was
specifically construed under state statutes to be a part of
the life insurance business. Similarly, in many states the
laws governing investments by insurance companies per-
mitted extensive or unlimited investment of insurance
company assets in common stocks. New Jersey, for ex-
ample, has imposed no limit whatever on overall common
stock investment by insurance companies since 1904, al-
though under present law, investment by a life insurance
company in the stock of any one corporation is limited to
twenty per cent of any class of voting stock of such cor-
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porationY As a consequence, in these jurisdictions, life
insurance companies have enjoyed the authority to issue
contracts, including annuity contracts, keyed largely or
entirely to common stock investments, although this
authority may not have been extensively utilized.
It is proper to assume that Congress had full knowledge
of the existence of these state laws regulating life insurance
company investment powers, and the authority conferred
by these laws at the time the 1933 act was passed and
its exemption provided, for the court in Prudential Ins. v.
Benjamin," in referring to the action of Congress in pass-
ing the McCarran Act, stated: ". . . Congress must have
had full knowledge of the nation-wide existence of state
systems of regulation and taxation [of insurance com-
panies] ..
Nothing appears in section 3 (a) (8) of the original 1933
act to the effect that an annuity contract, in order to qualify
for the exemption, must guarantee a predetermined level
of benefits or employ certain minimum assumptions as to
mortality or investment results. In fact, no qualifications,
restrictions, or requirements whatever are attached to the
word "annuity" except that it must be a contract issued by
a company subject to the supervision of a state insurance
commissioner. According to the statute, it is this insurance
department control, without regard to the characteristics
of the annuity, which secures the exemption for the con-
tract. Without such supervision, though the annuity might
be eminently fair and desirable, the exemption would not
apply. In view of this absence of qualification, there can
be no logical reason for attempting to construe the ex-
emption afforded as applying only to fixed-dollar annuities
and not to variable annuities. This is especially clear when
one considers that any mutual life insurance company
47 N.J. STAT. Am. § 17:24-2 (Supr. 1956).
48 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
49 Id. at 430.
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could obtain a variable annuity type effect with fixed-dollar
annuities through the employment of extremely con-
servative investment projections, achieving variation
through the payment of unusually large insurance divi-
dends. Such a plan. might be inequitable to those an-
nuitants who purchased their contracts at different times,
and would certainly be difficult to manage, yet it would
qualify for the exemption of section 3 (a) (8). The straight
variable annuity approach, unencumbered by the sub-
terfuge of unrealistic fixed benefit minimums dependent
upon large insurance dividends for acceptability, is cer-
tainly a much more direct, understandable, and equitable
procedure for attaining the desired result.
A construction of the term "annuity" so as to require a
guaranteed minimum benefit constitutes alteration of sec-
tion 3 (a) (8) by impliedly adding standards and restric-
tions relating to the basic investment assumption of the
annuity contract. There can be no more justification for
this than there could be for a claim that section 3 (a) (8) im-
poses standards and specifies tests for the mortality as-
sumptions to be used with regard to the contract. Certainly,
under a pretext of determining the applicability of the ex-
emption, the Securities and Exchange Commission could
not pass judgment on the basic mortality assumptions in an
annuity contract. Neither is there any reason why the
commission should judge the investment assumptions.
The payment of benefits keyed to investment results
is a practice which has been long employed by life in-
surance companies. A common settlement option under
life insurance contracts is one whereunder the proceeds of
the policy are held by the company at interest. The rate
of interest is generally specified as a stated percentage plus.
whatever additional amount the board of directors might
allow. This additional amount is allowed only if it is justi-
fied by the company's investment earning experience
1957)
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Over the years there has been a considerable variation in
the actual amounts paid by any given company under
this type of option.
As previously indicated, a life insurance company would
assume risks in the issuance of variable annuity contracts
because of the guarantee of mortality and expense as-
sumptions. There can be no basis whatever for a con-
tention that the assumption of an investment risk is a
necessary characteristic of a life insurance company con-
tract. In fact, there are issued many types of contracts, such
as term policies and a large proportion of group insurance
policies, which involve practically no investable reserves,
and therefore have non-existent or negligible assumptions
as to investment return.
Since the only standard imposed by section 3 (a) (8) of
the 1933 act is that the company must be subject to the
supervision of a state insurance commissioner, it seems
obvious that Congress intended to leave to such com-
missioner the determination whether a particular contract
was properly designated as an insurance or annuity con-
tract. There nowhere appears an indication that Congress
expected that this determination would be either made or
reviewed by the Securities and Exchange Commission or
any other federal agency. The question of whether and to
what extent risk was to be assumed by the company could
be resolved only upon the basis of actuarial analysis of the
assumptions underlying the contract and it would be ab-
surd to assume that the SEC was supposed to attempt to
make these endless determinations. The SEC historically
has concurred in this conclusion, for there is no indication
that it has ever attempted to pick and choose among con-
tracts of life insurance companies on the basis of the
presence, absence, or extent of risk assumption.
The most reasonable and workable interpretation of the
exemption is that all such technical distinctions were to
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be left to the determination of state insurance departments
and that anything they might designate as an insurance or
annuity contract comes within the exemption. It must be
kept in mind that the exception is not applicable merely
to the contracts of life insurance companies, but relates
as well to the wide variety of contracts issued in the fire,
casualty, marine and other insurance lines, some of which
may involve little or no risk to the company. Certainly it
was never intended that the SEC should attempt its own
independent investigation as to the risk involved in all the
endless complicated types of insurance contracts covering
all lines of insurance.
The 1940 act relates only to "investment companies"
and specifically provides that a company, organized as an
insurance company and subject to the supervision of a state
insurance department, is not an investment company if
its primary and predominant business activity is the writ-
ing of insurance contracts.5"
The language of this exemption from the definition of
"investment company" became the basis of a suit for in-
junction by the Securities and Exchange Commission
against the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company.
The complaint alleged that the company, whose business
is devoted solely to the sale of variable annuities with
additional life insurance features, was primarily engaged
in the business of investing, reinvesting and trading in
securities within the definition of an "investment com-
pany" contained in the 1940 act; that the VALIC contracts
constituted investment contracts and certificates of interest
or participation in a profit-sharing agreement within the
definition of the term "security" contained in the 1933
act; and that consequently VALIC must first register with
the SEC under both acts before proceeding with the sale
of its contracts. The commission claimed jurisdiction be-
50 54 STAT. 793, 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2 (a) (17), 80a-3 (c) (3) (1952).
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cause the company was organized and chartered and has
its principal place of business in the District of Columbia.
The action is being defended on the basis that VALIC
is a life insurance company, supervised and regulated by
a qualified insurance department; that the exemptions
from the federal securities acts apply; and that its contracts
are insurance contracts.
Section 24 (d) of the 1940 act states that the exemption
provided by section 3 (a) (8) of the 1933 act ". . . shall not
apply to any security of which an investment company is
the issuer." This section thus interrelates the provisions of
the two acts in so far as they have a bearing on the insur-
ance business. The 1940 act does not purport to list or refer
to the various types of contracts which may be issued in the
course of the "writing of insurance." The reference to
insurance in section 2(a) (17) of the 1940 act is of the
broadest and most general nature. In view of the aforesaid
statutory interrelation, it follows that the writing of any
contract which fits within the insurance exemption of sec-
tion 3 (a) (8) of the 1933 act constitutes the writing of in-
surance within section 2 (a) (17) of the 1940 act.
In passing, it should be noted that, like section 3 (a) (8)
of the 1933 act, section 2 (a) (17) of the 1940 act contains
no standards, requirements, or qualifications to be met by
"insurance," nor are there any specifications relating to
investment or mortality assumptions, or other character-
istics of any contract. Once again, there is no basis for as-
suming that the SEC was expected to analyze individually
specialized contracts issued by insurance companies to de-
termine whether and to what extent they qualified as
"insurance." Rather this determination was intended to be
left to the supervising state insurance departments.
The 1934 act, inter alia, regulates brokers and dealers
selling securities, requires reports, and imposes controls
upon companies whose securities are listed on national
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securities exchanges. In view of what has been said with
regard to the exemption of insurance company contracts
under the 1933 act, it does not appear that the 1934 act
would have any application to variable annuity contracts
issued by a life insurance company.
VII. THE McCARRAN ACT
It is clear that none of the federal securities acts purport
to regulate the "business of insurance." In fact, each of
these acts specifically exempts such business from the
effect of its provisions. In enacting the Securities Act of
1933, the act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act
of 1940, Congress acted under the power afforded by the
commerce clause of the federal Constitution. Under this
clause, Congress may assume control of a particular phase
of interstate commerce by specific enactment; it may de-
cline to "occupy" an area through failure to take positive
action; or it may specifically express an intention that
control over a particular area be maintained by the state
or states involved. The effect of either of the last two
courses of action would be the same, but as to the business
of insurance, the latter of the two courses was followed.
Section 2 of the McCarran Act provides:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person en-
gaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, un-
less such Act specifically relates to the business of in-
surance: Provided, that after January 1, 1948, the Act
of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act,
and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known
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as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amend-
ed, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to
the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law.5 '
Although insurance companies are thus susceptible to
being made subject to both state and federal control,
federal regulation under present congressional policy is
limited to areas in which the states have not undertaken
regulation. The acts specifically enumerated in the McCar-
ran Act were inapplicable to insurance companies until
January 1, 1948, and thereafter were applicable only to
the extent that insurance was not regulated by state law.
It will be noted that there is no enumeration of the various
federal securities acts in section 2 (b) and accordingly, as
to these acts, section 2(a) applies with full force and
effect to exclude their application under the familiar doc-
trine that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."2
VIII. STATE V. FEDERAL REGULATION
Just as there is no justification for contending that the
sale of variable annuities comes within the purview of
existing federal securities laws, there is no reasonable basis
for making such sale subject to federal regulation. The
laws presently regulating the insurance industry adequately
assure the public of all necessary protections and they are
far more effective controls than might be imposed by the
SEC. The proposals advocating federal regulation seem to
ignore completely the far-reaching and comprehensive
regulation of insurance companies by state departments.
A prime example of this attitude may be found in a
recent case 3 involving a Texas corporation licensed to
51 54 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952).
52 State ex rel. Whall v. Saenger Theatres Corp., 190 Miss. 391, 200 So4
442, 446 (1941).
53 In the Matter of The American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., F.T.C.
No. 6237, April 24, 1956.
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conduct an insurance business in fourteen states, including
Texas. Asserting that brochures, distributed to agents out-
side of Texas and shown by them to prospective insureds,
contained advertising material which was false, misleading,
deceptive, and violative of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the FTC issued a complaint against this corporation.
Noting that each of the states involved, except Mississippi,
had statutes prohibiting the distribution within its borders
of insurance advertising material which was false or mis-
leading and that, therefore, such states fully regulated the
business of insurance in this connection, the hearing ex-
aminer determined that the McCarran Act had removed
FTC jurisdiction over such advertising and dismissed the
complaint. By a three to two majority, the FTC on appeal
reversed the examiner's finding and asserted jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unamimously
reversed, interpreting the McCarran Act to exclude FTC
jurisdiction.54
As pointed out by the dissenting members of the com-
mission and by the court of appeals, the commission de-
cision did violence to the plain language of the McCarran
Act limitation that ". . . the Federal Trade Commission
Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of in-
surance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law," and ignored the clear expression of congres-
sional intent that the states continue to regulate the busi-
ness of insurance. In so doing, the commission implied that
the McCarran Act had no effect whatsoever, and, perhaps,
questioned the power of Congress to exercise its control
over certain areas of interstate commerce by consenting
to state legislation.5
54 American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, No. 16132, 5th Cir.,
April 9, 1957.
55 See 32 NoTma DAwE LAW. 319 (1957).
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Aside from purely legal considerations, what is the
practical valuation that might be placed on each of the
alternative forms of control? It is a popular misconception
that the Securities and Exchange Commission approves
securities issues and thus in some sense guarantees to the
buyer that he is making a good investment. Quite to the
contrary, it is a criminal offense to make any statement to
the effect that the SEC has "approved" a registered
security and every prospectus must so state on its face.
In reality, the SEC merely requires "full disclosure" by
specifying that the prospectus reveal the pertinent facts
concerning the security about to be issued. It makes no
assertion whatever about the soundness of a particular
security.
In a recent speech, SEC Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong
said specifically that, ".... the Federal securities laws do
not, and, I hope never will, give the Commission power to
pass on the merits of securities.""6
At a "Fulbright Committee" hearing in March, 1955, Mr.
Harold E. Wood, Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, was asked
about a particular SEC prospectus, and particularly
whether he would call it a reasonable promotion. His reply,
bearing on the effectiveness of SEC control, is most en-
lightening: "No; of course I wouldn't. Of course, that is all
covered, Senator Fulbright, by full disclosure, and when
the issue is registered with the SEC and there is a full
disclosure, they are helpless and we are helpless to do
anything about that."57 Asked by the chairman whether
this helplessness was a healthy situation, Mr. Wood replied
that, "... if you do anything else, though, than required a
full disclosure, you are getting into a paternalistic situa-
56 Address by SEC Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong, Investment Bank-
ers Association of America Meeting, November 26, 1956.
57 Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
84th Cong., 1st Sess, at 325 (1955).
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tion."' One further pertinent comment made by Mr. Wood
at this hearing was his statement that, "When you come
to the question of prospectuses there is also the problem
that people just do not read them."59 How effective, then,
is a control and supervision whereunder any type of
security may be sold so long as the "pertinent facts" are
contained in a prospectus the potential purchasing public
is not expected to read, the enforcing agency being then
"helpless" to do anything further? What special protections
are offered to the public under a system of regulation
where the philosophy, as expressed to a congressional sub-
committee by Mr. Keith Funston, President of the New
York Stock Exchange, is to the effect that: "If some
Americans refuse either to read or believe the true facts
about an enterprise and persist in throwing their money
away, then their losses are the price we must pay in a free
society for the right to invest or speculate as we please."60
The situation is much different when it comes to ap-
proval by state insurance departments of insurance policies
and annuity forms. The pending New Jersey variable an-
nuity legislation would give to the Department of Banking
and Insurance the broadest type of regulatory power, not
only over the variable annuity contract forms, but over
advertising and sales methods as well. The Department
would be required to pass, not only on whether the facts
are disclosed, but on whether the variable annuity con-
tract is just, fair, and equitable. In other words, it would
pass on the substance and the content of the contract and
not only on its form. Even people who "refuse either to
read or believe the true facts" are protected by the state
agency control.
There are, of course, more obvious reasons why state
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1955, p. 43, col. 1.
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control in this field must certainly be more effective and
more satisfactory than federal control, and not the least of
these is familiarity with the specialized subject matter. The
state insurance departments have built up a vast wealth of
experience and knowledge relating to the general insur-
ance business and all forms of life insurance policies and
annuities. In the particular field, the commissioners and
their staffs are thoroughly familiar with the principles of
sound annuity writing and are equipped to properly evalu-
ate every aspect of this business. The complex actuarial
arithmetic on which annuity contracts are based singularly
illustrates the difference between a variable annuity and
the type of contract with which the federal regulatory com-
mission has training or experience. Moreover, if this is true
about the individual contract, consider the group contracts
on a variable basis covering qualified employee pension
plans. The federal regulatory authorities are far less
equipped to deal with that complicated specialized field of
insurance.
Another fallacy in the argument that federal regulation
is necessary becomes apparent in view of the fact that a
big part of the "trusteed pension plan" competition which
insurance companies face in the pension field is not subject
in any way to the far-reaching regulation to which life
insurance companies must submit in their group annuity
operations. It seems incongruous that a trusteed variable
annuity plan need not have to be regulated at either the
state or federal level, but that if a life insurance company
does the same thing, it must be regulated at both levels.
Aside from these distinctions in the efficiency, experi-
ence, thoroughness, and desirability of the two forms of
regulation, certain other problems would arise under a
system of dual control, which weigh strongly against the
adoption of such a system. The likely creation of contro-
versy and doubt as to jurisdiction and methods of forcing
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compliance certainly cannot be said to recommend the
controls suggested. For example, SEC jurisdiction might
well result in conflict with state insurance regulation and
taxation in the areas of accounting procedures and forms;
control of company operation through required deposits
against liabilities; premium taxes; disposition of earn-
ings; maintenance of reserves; examination of insur-
ance companies; content of policies; prohibitions against
misrepresentation and discrimination; control of adver-
tising and sales methods; and federal income taxation.
Insofar as the requirements of SEC control would differ
from the existing system of regulation prescribed by
the state insurance departments so as to require two
distinct procedures where possible, or the choice of
one when necessary, as seen from the discussion of
the McCarran Act,6 such assumption of control by the
SEC would constitute a contravention of expressed con-
gressional intent, as it appears in that act, by an administra-
tive agency.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is not necessary to emphasize the current and con-
tinuing need for an economic tool designed to meet the
problem presented by the impact of cost-of-living changes
on long-term retirement plans. The life insurance industry
as a whole has a responsibility to cooperate with the
initiative, thrift, and self-reliance of the great mass of
average wage earners in order to provide them with
effective security plans. The variable annuity principle is
singularly adaptable to this end, and in fact is the only
workable approach to the problem which has yet been sug-
gested.
61 See text, VII. THE McCAmtm AcT.
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The complex and thorough system of state regulation
grown out of years of experience has adequately and
efficiently controlled the insurance industry to secure the
maximum degree of protection; this same control will
effectively be extended to the issuance and sale of vari-
able annuity contracts. For both legal and practical
reasons, there is no justification for intervention in this
regulation by a federal agency.
Since the foregoing article was prepared, there have been
several pertinent developments in the variable annuity
field. The S.E.C's suit for injunction against VALIC went
to trial on June 10, 1957.62 The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., was granted permission to inter-
vene as party plaintiff and The Equity Annuity Life In-
surance Company, whose situation is quite similar to
VALIC's, has joined as party defendant. As of this writing,
no decision has been rendered.
In West Virginia, VALIC successfully defended, against
an ex parte action by the state securities commissioner, its
right to do a variable annuity business in! that state. Without
any prior hearing, the commissioner by letter attempted to
order VALIC "to cease and desist" the offering or selling of
"securities" in West Virginia. VALIC immediately pointed
out the illegality of the purported "cease and desist" letter,
the identity of the issues in the S.E.C. v. VALIC case and
the arbitrary rejection by the commissioner of all sugges-
tions looking to an amicable disposition of the controversy.
On February 8, 1957, VALIC brought suit for declaratory
judgment. The judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County, West Virginia, on March 14, 1957, held that there
was no statutory authority for the purported "order," con-
cluded that there was nothing before him for judicial re-
view, and dismissed without prejudice to such other action
62 N.Y. Times, June 11, 1957, p. 51, col. 7.
63 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Sims, Civil No. -, Cir. Ct., W. Va.,
March 14, 1957.
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as VALIC might determine should be taken 3 VALIC has,
without further interference, resumed the sale of variable
annuities in West Virginia.
The sufficiency of state systems of regulation in this area
has been borne out in Connecticut. In the recent case of
Spelacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n,64 the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut has held that a fraternal benefit
society may not, under the state law governing fraternals,
issue variable endowment policies. While the decision
would not be binding on an insurance company seeking a
license to do a variable annuity business in that state, since
it would not be a fraternal society, one cannot quarrel with
the proposition that the decision was within the scope of
state regulation. The laws of the several states as to the
admission of foreign companies to do business, as well as
the authority of domestic companies, are not identical and
any insurance company must accept the necessity of quali-
fying under the laws of a particular state if it wishes to do
business there. The state courts are the appropriate forums
to decide the status of variable annuities under the various
state statutes.
By unanimous vote in June, both houses of the Wisconsin
legislature passed three bills (Wisc. S.196, S.401 and S. 491)
which would incorporate a variable annuity program,6" on
much the same basis as the C.R.E.F. plan, into that state's
retirement system for state employees. These bills are pres-
ently before the governor for signature.
J. Edward Day*
64 - Conn. -, 131 A.2& 834 (1957).
65 See Journal of Commerce, June 17,1957, p. 1.
* Vice President, The Prudential Insurance Company of America.
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